Consumers' and firms' behavior by Nocco
					, 
						Antonella
The remaining part of the work is organized as follows: Section 2 describes consumers’ and
firms’ behavior, while the innovative sector is more deeply analyzed in Section 3; Section 4 draws
the characteristics of the equilibrium outcomes which are “moving” with particular changes in
the distribution of workers; Section 5 presents some comments on the results, while Section 6
concludes.
2 Consumers’ and firms’ behavior
We consider a closed economy in which consumers love variety and their preferences are described
by the following intertemporal utility function
U =
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e−ρt log
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σ


σ
σ−1
dt (1)
where Dc is the consumption of variety c, ρ is the rate of time preference and σ > 1 is both the
elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties and the own-price elasticity of demand for
any variety. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in (1) is constant and equal to 1, while n
is the total number of produced varieties in t.
Total consumers’ expenditure E is defined as
E =
nX
c=1
pcDc
where pc is the price of variety c.
Consumers’ demand xc for any variety c is
xc =
p−σc
nX
c=1
p1−σc
E (2)
All varieties are produced by firms which need to buy a patent from the R&D sector to start
their activity and which employ γ workers to produce a unit of their output. Given the assumptions
of consumers’ love for variety and the fact that there are no scope economies, all firms produce
diﬀerent varieties.
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Moreover, firms are not all supposed to use the same production process, given that γ is not
necessarily equal for all firms. More precisely, we assume that there are i diﬀerent groups of firms,
each of which is characterized by a particular value of γ, that is γm, which expresses the specific
units of labor required to produce one unit of the output by the nm firms of the group of type m,
with m = 1, 2, ......, i.
We assume that the higher the value of m, the lower the value of γm is and, therefore, the
higher the productivity of workers employed by firms of type m is. Each period is characterized
by a particular value of i, which increases when a new group of goods is made available through
R&D eﬀorts in the innovative sector. We assume that any time the value of i increases, a new,
more productive process is made available and new firms use the more productive production
process. More details on how new values of γ are made available will be given in next section
which describes the innovative sector. For the moment, we only anticipate that by producing
new patents, researchers in the R&D sector exploit the knowledge accumulated by past innovative
activities and that the development of a suﬃciently large number of varieties allows them to
introduce new patents characterized by higher productivity levels (that is, by lower γ values).
Hence, if there are only i groups of variety, each of numerousness nm, we derive from (2) the
demand xm for any firms characterized by γm
xm =
p−σm
iX
j=1
njX
j=1
p1−σj
E (3)
with m = 1, 2, ......, i.
Given that all varieties of type m are symmetric, total expenditure in varieties of the same
type is
nmpmxm =
nmp
1−σ
m
iX
j=1
njp
1−σ
j
E (4)
with m = 1, 2, ......, i.
Considering the intertemporal component of consumers’ allocation problem, following Gross-
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man and Helpman (1991) we define the index of the manufactured output
D ≡
Ã iX
m=1
nmx
α
m
! 1
α
where α = σ−1σ , and the ideal price index of final goods
pD ≡
Ã iX
m=1
nmp
1−σ
m
! 1
1−σ
Given that D = E/pD, the intertemporal utility function (1) becomes
U =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt (logE − log pD) dt
As Grossman and Helpman (1991, pag. 48) show, the maximization of the previous expression
“subject to an intertemporal budget constraint requires that spending evolve according to”
E˙
E
= r − ρ
Then we normalize prices in such a way that total expenditure E is equal to 1.3 This implies
that we have
r = ρ (5)
Consumption varieties are produced by monopolistically competitive firms, which sustain a
fixed cost in order to acquire a patent produced in the innovative sector and a variable cost of
production. Since each firm maximizes profits, we know that price pm is
pm =
1
α
γmw (6)
where α = (σ − 1)/σ and w is the nominal wage.
We notice that the ratio between prices of any pair of varieties is proportional to the ratio of
labor required to obtain one unit of each type of good with
pm
pj
=
γm
γj
(7)
3 Cfr. Grossman and Helpman (1991)
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where m, j = 1, 2, ......, i.
Operating profits realized by a single firm of type m are
πm =
µ
1− α
α
¶
wγmxm
In equilibrium, when supply, xm, is equal to demand (3), substituting prices from (6), we obtain
that profits πm are
πm = (1− α)
γ1−σm
iX
j=1
njγ
1−σ
j
< 1 (8)
From the previous expression, we know that profits, πm, decrease when the total number of firms
increases, while they increase as productivity increases. In particular, for the more productive
varieties, characterized by m = i, we know not only that profits decrease as ni increases, with
∂πi/∂ni < 0, but also that they increase as γ decreases, given that ∂πi/∂γi < 0.
Total labor demand by firms of type m, Lm, is given by
Lm = nmγmxm (9)
Moreover, considering (4) together with (6), we derive that Lm is equal to
Lm =
αnmp
1−σ
m
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Given that the total number of units of workers in the economy is L, the labor market clearing
condition requires that
L = LR +
iX
m=1
Lm (11)
where LR is the total amount of labor employed in the innovative sector and will be described
in the following section.4 Finally, we define LC as the total amount of labor employed in the
production of consumption goods which corresponds to
LC =
iX
m=1
Lm
4 We simply assume that the switching technology cost for existing firms consists in a diﬀerent, too high fixed
cost which firms that are already in the market have to sustain to be able to use the process innovation generated
within the R&D sector. This enables us to avoid considering the case of old firms switching technology.
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